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Question 
What does evidence tell us about the continuing barriers (political, social, and economic) to 
preventing deforestation and degradation of Indonesia’s tropical rainforests and peatlands? 
Based on the available literature, how does the country’s political decentralization impact the 
prevention, or acceleration, of its forest loss? 
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1. Summary 
Indonesia has undertaken a range of measures to address the country’s high rates of 
deforestation and land degradation, but significant barriers remain to meeting the targets set out 
by these measures and by international agreements. Recent progress in reducing deforestation 
rates after a period of significant increase indicates that some of these measures have been 
effective in curbing deforestation and land degradation. However, a number of governance 
challenges and persistent economic and social drivers of deforestation remain unaddressed in 
the current legal and policy framework.   
This report summarises available evidence on the continuing barriers to effective implementation 
of laws and policies to address deforestation and degradation of Indonesia’s tropical rainforests 
and peatlands. Given the significance of Indonesia’s forests and peatlands in global efforts to 
combat tropical deforestation and to reduce carbon emissions, a significant number of academic 
studies and policy reports have explored these barriers in detail. This rapid literature review 
presents a brief summary of this evidence and of the guidance that has been produced to inform 
improved forest and peatland management in Indonesia.  
Following a brief background to deforestation and land degradation in Indonesia, the remaining 
sections of the report are structured around four categories of barriers that are prominent in the 
academic and policy literature: 
• Governance barriers resulting from Indonesia’s decentralised governance system and 
from corruption 
• Economic barriers driven by the demand for agricultural and forest-related products and 
by livelihoods demands  
• Barriers resulting from land rights and land reform challenges  
• Barriers to effective participation in policies and programmes to address deforestation 
and land degradation 
There is broad agreement in the literature that these longstanding, interrelated factors will persist 
for some time, therefore focus should be placed on mitigation in the short term with a view to 
gradual elimination of these barriers in the longer term. Blanket restrictive measures have been 
found to be ineffective or to bring about negative secondary effects (see for example: Cadman et 
al., 2019; Toumbouru, 2017). Many observers also cite a lack of coordination and incomplete 
implementation of existing measures as a major driving factor for their ineffectiveness. Some  
authors therefore recommend improved coordination and more comprehensive interventions that 
address the interrelationship of these barriers (see for example: Ekawati et al., 2019; 
Resosudarmo et al., 2019). 
An overarching issue that cuts across each of these barriers is the complex network of 
stakeholders involved in forest and peatland management in Indonesia. From international 
donors and regulators, to a myriad of national-level across including the president, the People’s 
Consultative Assembly (Indonesia’s legislative branch) and multiple government ministries, 
provincial and district-level governing actors, multinational companies, large and small domestic 
enterprises, international consumers, and perhaps most critically, local residents and those 
reliant on forests and peatlands for their livelihoods. Any measure to address deforestation and 
land degradation must be aware of the often conflicting incentives and ambitions of this diverse 
group of stakeholders. Some studies have explicitly studied this network of stakeholders and the 
 3 
relationships among them (see for example Enrici & Hubacek, 2019; Gallemore et al, 2015; 
Mulyani & Jepson, 2013). These studies may be a useful entry point when formulating measures 
to address deforestation and land degradation. It may also be helpful to monitor these 
relationships during the implementation of policy and legal instruments as the motivations and 
ambitions of different stakeholders are dynamic. Shifts in motivation and ambition could bring 
about new barriers or introduce new opportunities to address deforestation and land degradation 
in Indonesia.   
2. Background 
Indonesia has the third largest extent of primary tropical forest in the world and the 
country’s peatlands are the largest source of forest-based emissions globally (Cadman et 
al., 2019). Indonesia is also considered the second largest emitter of greenhouses gases from 
forests, though this figure is contested by the Indonesian government (Tacconi & Muttaqin, 
2019). Deforestation and the degradation of Indonesia’s tropical rainforests and peatland is 
therefore not only a significant policy focus of the Government of Indonesia (GoI) but also of the 
international community. Actions that are taken at different levels of government within Indonesia 
are highly influenced by international actors and wider global climate change mitigation 
processes. 
 
“Compared to other tropical countries, Indonesia has made strong progress in reducing 
deforestation in recent years” (Wijaya et al., 2019). According to GoI deforestation estimates, 
deforestation declined by 40,000 hectares between 2017 and 2018 (Wijaya et al., 2019). Global 
Forest Watch estimates a 40% decrease in deforestation in 2018 compared to the 2002-2016 
average annual rate of loss (Wijaya et al., 2019). This, however, follows a long period of 
increasing rates of deforestation and land degradation. Estimates vary on Indonesia’s 
deforestation rate, but conservative estimates indicate more than one million hectares of 
rainforest are lost each year, approximately 70% occurring in forests and 30% in peatland forests 
(Gunawan, 2004).  
Deforestation and land degradation vary significantly by region and many barriers to 
prevention are driven by contextual factors. Despite Indonesia’s overall decrease in 
deforestation in 2018, rates in East Kalimantan, Maluku and West Papua increased by more than 
35% compared to 2017 (Wijaya, 2019). Figure 1 shows total primary forest loss and 
deforestation increases in 2018 for the seven provinces with the highest deforestation rates in 
Indonesia.  
The People’s Consultative Assembly and the President of Indonesia have passed an 
increasing amount of forest-related policy over the last 20 years (Erbaugh & Nurrochmat, 
2019). A landmark shift in ambition came about in 2009 when then-President Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono announced an ambitious voluntary pledge to cut emissions by between 26% and 
41% by 2030. Many of Indonesia’s deforestation and land degradation ambitions fall within this 
wider, high profile initiative. The announcement also attracted significant finance and technical 
support from multilateral agencies and donors, many of which feed into forest management 
policies and programmes (Boer, 2020, p.787).  
Indonesia is a priority country for the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Degradation (REDD+) initiative, bringing significant international finance and technical 
support into the country. REDD+ was initiated at COP-13 in Bali with the aim of providing 
economic incentives to low- and middle-income countries to reduce carbon emissions through 
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deforestation and forest degradation.  REDD+ is a mechanism which provides an economic 
incentive to encourage developing countries to reduce carbon emissions through deforestation 
and forest degradation and to enhance forest carbon stocks through investment in low-carbon 
development, conservation and sustainable forest management (UN REDD, 2019). The GoI has 
been working on plans to implement REDD+ since 2007 but the process has been slow and has 
largely failed to meet expectations (Ekiwati et al., 2019). A significant amount of the literature 
exploring barriers to deforestation and land degradation in Indonesia is centred around analysis 
of the REDD+ process and challenges to its implementation. 
 
See: Figure 1: Primary forest loss in Indonesia (2018), Wijaya, 2019; adapted from Global Forest Watch, 
https://www.wri.org/blog/2019/07/indonesia-reducing-deforestation-problem-areas-remain 
3. Governance barriers  
Indonesia’s decentralised system means that the majority of policies to address 
deforestation and land degradation are initiated and developed at the national level, but 
implemented at provincial, district and village-levels. Areas classified as state forest are 
controlled and administered by the Ministry of Environment and Forestry, while areas classified 
as non-forest are controlled and administered by governors or districts heads. District 
governments have the authority to issue land use permits – such as for plantation and mining 
use, and village governments are responsible for negating with companies or investments in their 
villages (Irwan et al. 2019, p.4). Forest management units (FMUs) are an additional form of forest 
administration where the central government sets the conditions, while management is operated 
by a local statutory body (Boer, 2020). This extensive decentralisation of authority over forest 
and land use has led to an increase in the number of jurisdiction and district splits, further 
compounding administrative responsibility structures (Alesina et al., 2018).  
 
A lack of coordination across ministries at the national-level is widely cited as a 
significant barrier to effective legal and policy implementation (Boer, 2020; Cadman, 2019; 
Ekawati el al., 2019, Gallemore et al., 2015). National-level agencies responsible for forest and 
peatland oversight include: the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (MoEF), the Ministry of 
Public Works (MoPW), the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (MoEMR), the National 
Land Agency (NLA) and the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA). Furthermore, the division of 
responsibilities between these ministries changes frequently. Erbaugh & Nurrochmat (2019) note 
that the structure of government organisations managing and regulating forests in Indonesia 
changed more between 1999-2016 than in the 30 years prior. They go on to observe that the 
“overlapping land use claims and layered authority of different ministries and sub-national 
jurisdiction challenge the enforcement of national policy and promote local forms of tenure and 
planning” (p. 143). Misalignment and coordination issues have also been found to contribute to 
higher transaction costs in building relationships around forest and land governance as well as to 
ineffective information sharing at all levels (Gallemore et al., 2015) 
 
A key coordination issue at the national-level has been the regulation of the palm oil 
industry, one of the leading sectors contributing to deforestation and land degradation in 
Indonesia (see section 3 for further details on the impacts of palm oil on deforestation and land 
degradation). The regulation of palm oil falls within the remit of the MoA rather than the MoEF, 
with companies monitored by the MoEF required to plan in ten year cycles, while the MoA does 
not require this planning horizon (Cadman, 2019, p.6). Inconsistencies and a lack of coordination 
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in land allocations for different uses has also been noted, such as the allocation of old growth 
forests to be cleared for palm oil plantations and degraded land allocated to conservation 
(Toumbouru, 2017, p.5). 
 
Institutions and policies to address deforestation and land degradation developed at the 
national level often failed to be implemented at the sub-national level (Ekawati et al., 2019) 
For example, under REDD+, each province is expected to adopt provincial- or district-level action 
plans. To date, local action plans for greenhouse gas emissions reductions have been overseen 
by the National Development Planning Agency and Implemented by Regional Development 
Planning Agencies while only a small number of pilot regions have developed a REDD+ plan 
(Ekawati et al., 2019). 
 
The GoI is seeking to transfer further authority to the village level by expanding the area 
of social forestry schemes where local communities have some level of influence over 
decisions related to forest management (Muttaqin et al., 2019). Village administrations are the 
closest level of government to communities and are therefore well placed to incentivise positive 
natural resource management (Watts el al., 2019).The Village Law 6/2014 enhanced the 
authority of villages over land and natural resource management and has introduced a number of 
fiscal transfers to villages accompanied by highly decentralised budget decision-making powers 
(Watts et al., 2019). Section 6 explores some of the barriers to increased participation in these 
and other measures. 
 
Corruption in the forestry, plantation and mining sectors is widely cited as a barrier to 
effective legal and policy implementation (Alesina, 2018; Boer, 2020; Mulyani & Jepson, 
2013; Toumbourou, 2017). Higher rates of corruption have been shown to have a direct causal 
link with deforestation (Toumbourou, 2017). For example, the Indonesia Reforestation Fund, 
formed in 1989 and financed by a levy paid by timber concessionaires, is reported to have lost 
89% of its value in 1997 through mismanagement and fraud  (Mulyani & Jepson, 2013). The 
Indonesian Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and the Financial Intelligence Unit 
(PPTAK) have prosecuted a number of forest-related cases along the timber value chain through 
measures such as the issuing of concessions and monitoring market sales (Boer, 2020, p.789). 
In one example, “the KPK [Corruption Eradication Commission] succeeded in a high-profile case 
involving a Bupati [elected district head] in Riau Province, who was imprisoned for 11 years for 
contravening regulations and accepting bribes in the granting of palm oil concessions” (Boer, 
2020, p.789).  
 
Strengthening law enforcement to prevent forest and peatland fires and land clearing has 
been found to be one of the more efficient measures to address deforestation and land 
degradation (Wijaya, 2019). Laws relating to forest and land use have historically been 
ambiguous and enforcement has been under-resourced (Boer, 2020). Initiatives such as REDD+ 
have targeted further resources and capacity building in the implementation of existing laws to 
prevent deforestation and land degradation.  
4. Economic barriers  
The clearing of land for agriculture, timber products and mining activities is a leading 
cause of deforestation in Indonesia. Between 1986-2012, 5.8 million hectares of forest were 
converted to non-forest areas, 99% of which were for plantations (Ekawati et al., 2019). Palm oil 
production for the food industry and biofuel is of particularly high demand, and given that palm oil 
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can be grown in ‘shorter rotations’, “there [is] direct competition between forest and palm oil 
plantations for revenue generation… [with] palm oil declared a priority industry by government” 
(Cadman, 2019, p.6). The GoI recently announced that it plans to increase palm oil export levies 
which have been used to subsidise the expansion of palm biofuel production across the country 
(Reuters, 2020).  
 
Demand for agriculture is consistently associated with more deforestation, while timber is 
not (Busch & Ferretti-Gallon, 2017). Higher agricultural commodity prices and greater potential 
agricultural revenue in Indonesia, particularly from exports, has been associated with higher 
deforestation (Gaveau et al. 2009; Wheeler et al. 2013). Timber prices and timber activity have 
been found to be less consistently associated with higher deforestation, though satellite detection 
of large-scale deforestation may not fully detect fine-scale degradation caused by logging (Busch 
& Ferretti-Gallon, 2017, p.9). One reason given for the pulp and paper industry’s lower rates of 
deforestation is that the sector is highly concentrated, thus making it easier to control operations 
and through the supply chain (Pirard et al., 2015, p.2). Timber production is also overseen by the 
MoEF which employ forestry laws more favourable to conversation while palm oil is regulated by 
the MoA (Pirard et al., 2015, p.2).  
 
Government fiscal measures such as charges, subsidies in the palm oil sector and for 
fertiliser, licence and permit fees, and taxes, may further contribute to deforestation and 
land degradation according to a survey of stakeholders in the sector (Cadman et al., 2019). For 
example, fees charged in the forestry sector as a fiscal transfer from the central government to 
provincial and district government are based on the amount timber extracted and not on by good 
forest management and have therefore ended up rewarding districts with higher rates of 
deforestation as they (Cadman et al., 2019).  
 
The fragmented nature of the palm oil industry has been identified as a key barrier to 
implementing laws and policies to address deforestation and land degradation (Pirard et 
al., 2015) It is more difficult to trace production, and by extension to monitor adherence to 
conservation laws, among a large number of smallholder producers and an extended network of 
intermediaries (Pirard et al., 2015, p.4). ‘Zero-deforestation’ pledges have been made by some 
large palm oil companies operating in Indonesia with the stated goal of eliminating deforestation 
and land rights abuses from the palm oil supply chain (Pirard et al., 2015, p. 1). These pledges 
are indicative of a shift in market incentives in the palm oil industry, in part influenced by pressure 
from global consumers and civil society organisations around the ethics of palm oil production, 
though these initiatives risk marginalising already vulnerable smallholders (Pirard et al., 2015). 
Pirard et al. (2015) suggest that “farmer groups must also be strengthened to improve flows of 
information and knowledge sharing vertically along the supply chain and horizontally across the 
supply base. It is also necessary to invest in training, incentives, and monitoring and traceability 
systems that are adapted to local conditions, to ensure that smallholders, especially independent 
ones, comply with sustainability requirements”. (p.5) 
 
Poverty is an important driver of deforestation and land degradation and must also be 
considered as a possible negative secondary effect of ongoing policy and legal measures. 
Nearly 10% of the population live below the US$1.90/day poverty line and 20.6% of the 
population are estimated to be at risk of falling into poverty due to maintaining incomes only 
slightly above the poverty line (World Bank, 2020). Blanket measures to limit deforestation, such 
as moratoriums prohibiting land clearing, will need to account for the secondary impacts these 
might have on local communities dependent on forest resources for their livelihoods (Busch & 
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Ferretti-Gallon, 2017). Poverty reduction and deforestation programmes may also be 
complimentary, with some evidence suggesting that cash transfer programmes have had a 
positive indirect impact on deforestation reduction (Ferraro & Simorangkir, 2020).  
5. Land rights and land reform barriers 
Insecure land tenure is a widely cited barrier to addressing deforestation and land 
degradation (Astuti & Mcgregor, 2017; Cadman et al., 2019; Kubitza et al, 2017; Mulyani & 
Jepson, 2013; Toumbouru, 2017).  Disputes over land rights and the slow recognition of 
community land are a long-standing problem in Indonesia with significant impacts on the 
sustainable management of forest resources (Pirard et al., 2015, p.4). Much of the land used for 
agriculture is not formally titled, and while private titles can be purchased, this costs are typically 
prohibitive for lower income farmers (Kubitza et al, 2017).  
 
A number of studies examining the association between secure forest tenure and forest 
conditions have found positive correlations between both outcomes (see Toumbouru, 2017 
for further description of these studies). A survey of experts in forest and land governance found 
‘unclear land tenure and land classification’ to be the most widely cited factor contributing to 
deforestation in Indonesia (Toumbouru, 2017, p.3). “Unclear [land] tenure laws and rights results 
in a lack of regulation or effective management that may expose forests and land to predatory or 
unsustainable use, such as licenses for land-based industries associated with forest conversion 
(such as oil palm and pulp and paper plantations and mining concessions) being issued for areas 
of the forest zone” (Toumbouru, 2017, p.4). Pirard et al. (2015) observe that “’third party’ actors 
keep moving into concessions to clear land for their own livelihoods, with little public action to 
stop the phenomenon, even when it takes place on areas set aside for the purpose of 
conservation” (p.4). 
 
Challenges over land rights are partly rooted in struggles around identity that arose 
following the fall of the Suharto regime (Astuti & McGregor, 2017; Resosudarmo et al., 2019). 
Previously under Suharto, control over the majority of the country’s land was held under the 
authority of the MoEF and NLA in what were termed forest estates (kawasan hutan) (Astuti & 
McGregor, 2017). Newly classified areas restricted access by displacing indigenous and forest-
dependent peoples (Watts et al., 2019, p.3). Since the fall of the regime, “farmers and Indigenous 
communities intensified efforts to reclaim and reoccupy lands taken over by the state and private 
companies associated with the New Order regime” (Astuti & Mcgrwgor, 2017, p. 451). 
6. Barriers to participation  
A lack of engagement with local communities has been cited by many as a key barrier to 
the implementation deforestation and land degradation management measures (Ekawati et 
al., 2019; Muttaqin et al, 2019; Resosudarmo et al., 2019) It has been observed that there has 
been limited community involvement in the management of state forests to date (Muttaqin et al., 
2019). “State forest management in Indonesia has historically been dominated by large-scale 
entities through logging and plantation forest concession licenses…, community-based forest 
management (CBFM) accounted for only about 1% of the total area of production and protection 
forests”. (Muttaqin et al., 2019, p.2) Furthermore, Pirard et al (2015) argue that “a number of 
forest conservation and indigenous rights groups object to the premise that recent zero 
deforestation commitments may absolve or excuse past destructive practices, particularly 
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because past behaviours have enabled corporate groups to gain control of vast areas of land” 
(p.4).  
 
Misalignment of national and district-level objectives with village level objectives inhibits 
engagement with legal and policy measures at the local level (Watts et al., 2019). A survey 
of village heads involved in village-level intergovernmental fiscal transfers by Watts et a; (2019) 
found that while these funds provided environmental and livelihoods benefits, the funds did not 
align with the goals of the village. “The reasons ranged from the uneven distribution of benefits 
as only limited numbers of farmers to selected to participate in tree planting projects, the lack of 
alignment with village planning and lack of substantive participation” (p.5). Recent findings from a 
review of REDD+ stakeholders has found some improvements in participation through further 
emphasis on community consultations, though interrelated issues such as land rights claims and 
the appropriate disbursement of funding remain significant factors for meaningful community 
participation (Agung et al., 2014; Mulyani & Jepson, 2013). 
 
District-level ethnic diversity has been found to lead to increased competition for 
resources, leading to higher deforestation and land degradation (Alesina et al., 2018). 
Indonesia is highly diverse with more than 500 ethnic groups and 742 languages and dialects 
(Alesina et al., 2018, p.33). Coupled with high population density and historic exploitation of 
ethnic divisions by the Dutch during the colonial period, community relations around land use 
have been historically strained. Relations have continued to be strained since democratisation 
with a rise in identity politics and separatist movements (Alesina et al., 2018 p. 34). A study by 
Alesina et al. (2019) using the timing of the splitting of jurisdictions in Indonesia to examine the 
causal relationship between ethnic fractionalisation and deforestation found that more ethnically 
fractionalised areas had higher rates of deforestation. They concluded that there is “a trade-off 
between reduced ethnic heterogeneity and increased competition in the natural resource market 
when deciding the optimal level of decentralisation of natural resource management” (p.56) 
Astuti & McGregor (2017) also found that indigenous communities “favoured by the new political 
conjuncture and empowered by indigenous network may attempt to claim land from neighbouring 
communities that fit less comfortably within idealised visions of green integrity” (p.448). 
 
Not all communities prioritise deforestation and land degradation or have the necessary 
information to value conservation and reforestation (Watts et al. 2019). Based on a survey of 
village heads in 42 sites in Southeast Sulawesi, Watts el al. (2019) found that “communities we 
most likely to engage in activities that provide direct economic benefits to individual household, 
such as agroforestry or planting timber trees” (p.9).The authors therefore suggest improved 
communication and information sharing on the benefits to local communities as the allocation of 
specific funds for conservation and reforestation at the village-level in addition to, rather than in 
place of, the general village funds already being disbursed through fiscal transfer schemes.   
  
 9 
7. References 
Agung, P., Galudra, G., Van Noordwijk, M. & Maryani, R. (2014). Reform or reversal: the impact 
of REDD+ readiness on forest governance in Indonesia. Climate Policy, 14(6): 748-768. 
Alesina, A., Gennaiolo, C. & Lovo, S. (2018). Public Good and Ethnic Diversity: Evidence from 
Deforestation in Indonesia. Economica, 86: 32-66. 
Astuti, R. & McGregor, A. (2017). Indigenous land claims or green grabs? Inclusions and 
exclusions within forest carbon politics in Indonesia. The Journal of Peasant Studies, 44(2): 445-
466. 
Boer, H. (2020). Power, REDD+ and reforming forest governance in Indonesia. Third World 
Quarterly, 41(5): 783-800. 
Busch, J. & Ferretti-Gallon, K. (2017). What drives deforestation and what stops it? A meta-
analysis. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 11(1): 3-23. 
Cadman, T., Sarker, T., Muttaqin, Z., Nurfatriani, F., Salminah, M. & Maraseni, T. (2019). The 
role of fiscal instruments in encouraging the private sector and smallholders to reduce emissions 
from deforestation and forest degradation: evidence from Indonesia. Forest Policy and 
Economics, 108: 101913. 
Darmawan, R., Klasen, S. & Nuryartono, N. (2016). Migration and deforestation in Indonesia. 
EFForTS Discussion Paper Series, No.19, Göttingen: GOEDOC, Dokumenten- und 
Publikationsserver der Georg-August-Universität. 
Ekawati, S., Subarudi, Budiningsih, K., Sari, G., Muttaqin, M. (2019). Policies affecting the 
implementation of REDD+ in Indonesia (cases in Papua, Riau and Central Kalimantan. Forest 
Policy and Economics, 108, 101939. 
Enrici, A. & Hubacek, K. (2019). A crisis of confidence: stakeholder experiences of REDD plus in 
Indonesia. Human ecology, 47(1): 39-50. 
Erbaugh, J. & Nurrochmat, D. (2019). Paradigm shift and business as usual through policy 
layering: forest-related policy change in Indonesia (1999-2016). Land Use Policy, 86: 136-146. 
Ferraro, P. & Simorangkir, R. (2020). Conditional case transfers to alleviate poverty also reduced 
deforestation in Indonesia. Science Advances, 2020(6). 
Gallemore, C., Di Gregorio, M., Moeliono, M., Brockhaus, M. & Prasti, H. (2015). Transaction 
costs, power, and multi-level forest governance in Indonesia. Ecological Economics, 114: 168-
179.   
Gaveau, D., Linkie, M., Suyadi, S., Levang, P. & Leader-Williams, N. (2009). Three decades of 
deforestation in southwest Sumatra: Effects of coffee prices, law enforcement and rural poverty. 
Biological Conservation,142(3): 597–605.  
Gunawan, I. (2004). The Politics of the Indonesia Rainforest. Göttingen: Cuvillier Verlag. 
Irawan, S., Widiastomo, T., Tacconi, L., Watts, J. & Steni, B. (2019). Exploring the design of 
jurisdictional REDD+: the case of Central Kalimantan, Indonesia. Forest Policy and Economics, 
108: 101853. 
 10 
Kubitza, C., Krishna, V., Urban, K., Alamsyah, Z., Qaim, M. (2018). Land property rights, 
agricultural intensification, and deforestation in Indonesia. Ecological Economics, 147: 312-321. 
Mulyani, M. & Jepson, P. (2013). REDD+ and forest governance in Indonesia: A multistakeholder 
study of perceived challenges and opportunities. Journal of Environment & Development, 22(3): 
261-283. 
Pirard, R., Gnych, S., Pacheco, P. & Lawry, S. (2015). Zero-deforestation commitments in 
Indonesia, governance challenges. CIFOR infobrief 132. 
https://www.cifor.org//publications/pdf_files/infobrief/5871-infobrief.pdf 
Resosudarno, I., Tacconi, L., Sloan, S., Hamdani, F., Subarudi, Alviya, I & Muttaqin, M. (2019). 
Indonesia’s land reform: Implication for local livelihood and climate change. Forest Policy and 
Economics, 108: 101903. 
Reuters (2020). Indonesian government plans to raise palm oil export levy: minister. Reuters: 
Commodities: 26/02/2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-palmoil-levy/indonesian-
government-plans-to-raise-palm-oil-export-levy-minister-idUSKCN20K11E 
Tacconi, L. & Muttaqin, M. (2019). Reducing emissions from land use change in Indonesia: and 
overview. Forest Policy and Economics, 108: 101979. 
Toumbourou, T. (2017). Using a Delphi approach to identify the most efficacious interventions to 
improve Indonesia’s forest and land governance. Land use Policy, 2017. 
UNREDD (2019). About REDD+. UN-REDD Programme Collaborative Online Workspace. 
https://www.unredd.net/about/what-is-redd-plus.html 
Watts, J., Tacconi, L., Irawan, S., Wijaya, A. (2019). Village transfers for the environment: 
lessons from community-based development programs and the village fund. Forest Policy and 
Economics, 108, 101863. 
Wheeler, D., Hammer, D., Kraft, R., Dasgupta, S. & Blankespoor, B. (2013) Economic dynamics 
and forest clearing: A spatial econometric analysis for Indonesia. Ecological Economics 85: 85–
96. 
Wijaya, A., Samadhi, N., Juliane, R. (2019). Indonesia is reducing deforestation, but problem 
areas remain. World Resource Institute Blog. https://www.wri.org/blog/2019/07/indonesia-
reducing-deforestation-problem-areas-remain 
World Bank (2020). The World Bank in Indonesia: Context. 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/indonesia/overview#:~:text=Out%20of%20a%20population%20
of,above%20the%20national%20poverty%20line. 
 
Suggested citation 
Lenhardt, A. (2020). Barriers to preventing deforestation and degradation of Indonesia’s tropical 
rainforests and peatlands. K4D Helpdesk Report. Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies. 
 11 
About this report 
This report is based on six days of desk-based research. The K4D research helpdesk provides rapid syntheses 
of a selection of recent relevant literature and international expert thinking in response to specific questions 
relating to international development. For any enquiries, contact helpdesk@k4d.info. 
 
K4D services are provided by a consortium of leading organisations working in international development, led by 
the Institute of Development Studies (IDS), with Education Development Trust, Itad, University of Leeds Nuffield 
Centre for International Health and Development, Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine (LSTM), University of 
Birmingham International Development Department (IDD) and the University of Manchester Humanitarian and 
Conflict Response Institute (HCRI). 
 
This report was prepared for the UK Government’s Foreign, Commonwealth and 
Development Office (FCDO) and its partners in support of pro-poor programmes. Except 
where otherwise stated, it is licensed for non-commercial purposes under the terms of the 
Open Government Licence v3.0. K4D cannot be held responsible for errors, omissions or 
any consequences arising from the use of information contained in this report. Any views and 
opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of FCDO, K4D or any other contributing 
organisation.  
 
© Crown copyright 2020. 
 
